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IN TIIE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
.\1 YRTL_b; FLE\VELLll\U CHRISTENSEN 
' 
Plaintiff and Appellaut, 
vs. 
HAROLD _D_;LWOUD CHRI8'l'ENSEN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
S'l'ATEJ\IEN'l' OF l1-iAcrrs 
'l'he facts set forth by plaintiff are substantially cor-
rect, but contain gratuitous statements such as the first, 
second, third, and fifth paragraphs of Page three (3) 
of the Statement of Facts which contain extraneous 
matter not to be found in the transcript of record on 
appeal. Apparentl~', plaintiff desired to explain her posi-
tion as a fact rather than as argurnl'nt. In an effort to 
facilitate a proper understanding of the facts it is well 
to examine them chronologically. 
March 3, 1965, plaintiff signed complaint, March 4, 
19G5, complaint was filed. ( Ret ord X o. 1) The complaint 
prayed for an equitable settlement for the adjustment 
in circumstances brought about by the marriage. March 
3, 1965, the d!:'fendant signL'd a stipulatio·n. (Record 
No. 9) Mareh 3, 19G5, the defendant signed an Entry 
of Appearance, specifically reserving unto himself 20 
days in which to plead to plaintiff's <'Omplaint. (Record 
;\o. 7) Mareh l 2, 1%.), the d<>fendant exercised the 
reservation contairn'd in his Appearance and filed an 
Aus\n~r denying to plaintiff the right to any property 
and Counterclaiming for a divon·c~ for himself. (Retorr! 
No. 2) 
No further pleadings, motions or }H'OCPc•dings WPn~ 
filed until September 30, 1965, at which time the- matter 
came on regularly for trial and ·was tried. (Record No. 
21) November 2, 19G5, the plaintiff filed an Affidavit 
of Prejudice. N nvember 19, 1965 the Court exPcuted 
its Order denying the Affidavit of Prejudice, giviug 
plaintiff time in which to file a Brief. (Record No. 8) 
.January -1:, 19GG, .Memorandum D(•cision. (Record No. 10) 
This l\Iemorandnm directed the plaintiff to prt>pare Find-
ings of Fact, Condusions of Law and Decree. None were 
filed and the record discloses no reason sneh was not 
done. So that on l\larch 10, 1966, the defendant prepared 
Fndings of Fact, ·Conclusions o.f Law and Decree which 
\\'ere executed by the Comt on March 11, 1966. The 
plaintiff's counsel did not receive Notice of filing of 
these documents upon their executio.n and as a result 
she thereafter filed objections and an Order vacating 
these Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree; 
(Record No. 15) and plaintiff's counsel submitted l1is 
own Findings of Fact, Condusions of Law and Decree, 
which \\'Ne executed on March 17, 19GG. (Hecord No. 18) 
These likewise \\'ere submitted and executed without 
notice to the defendant who was afforded on oppor-
tunity, timewise, to object. 
The record discloses that both Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree as submitted by both 
parties were executed without notice to either party. 
The prnblerns of objections and motions came on for 
argument on May 2, 19GG, as demonstrated by the Court's 
Order. ( Reeord i\ o. lG) 
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'l'lte trnn:,;cript of the original procc·edings indicate 
tliat tl1<' tlPfen<lnnt 1rn:-: idling to ::;tipnlafr as to his 
;11r'o11l", 11ro.pPrty and lhP ·neol'1e and property of the 
plaintiff. (TL 9-11) That MithPr plaintiff nor plain-
tiff's eotmsel oh,ird<'d to c:ueh stipulation nor did they 
approve the same. In order to clarify this situation the 
~kmorandum Decision of ~fay 2, 1966, directed the de-
fendant and the plaintiff c'itlter to stipulate to the respec-
tive properties and the value thereof or that the Court 
11 onld accept further tPstimony dirPcted thereto. (Record 
No .2:1) 'I'hP i;laintiff refused to stipulate as to value. 
On .June 24, 196() t11P Court rPopened the matter to take 
te:stirnony as to the value of the property of the parties. 
(Record 17, 22) At the conclusion, the Court re-executed 
the Findings of Fact, Condusi.ons of Law and Decree 
theretofon~ submitted by the defendant. The record 
diseloses that the plaintiff was possessed o.f real property 
having a valu0 of $68,500.00. (Record No. 22) That the 
dc•f Pndant owm•d 41.;2 acres of land of a nominal value 
with an income of $100.00 per annum. (Record No. 22) 
'l'hat d(•frndant at the time of this divorce was age sixty-
eig-ht and had an inconw of $200.00 per month, pension. 
(Record No. 21) That plaintiff owned her own home 
\\'ith n rental apartment situatt> therein. That she lost 
$80.00 per month Social Secmity by rea~on of her mar-
riage to the defendant. (Record No. 21) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONTINU-
ING TO HEAR AND DETERMINE THE ISSUES 
IN SAID CAUSE AFTER THE FILING OF AN 
3 
AFFIDAVIT OF PREJUDICE UNDER RULE 63(b) 
U.R.C.P. 
The record is devoid of any 8tatements of the Court 
relative to the plaintiff ex<..'.ept, "I know l\ln:;. Christensen 
has a house on 25th Street. I know when she bought 
it from Archie l\lclntosh, and l know when she converted 
it into an apartment, so that is Yery well within the 
province of the Court." (Hecord No. 21, p. 9) "'l1he 
Court: "Whether voluntary or involuntary, generally 
when persons marry they'rt> going to take some loss and 
some gain. Now she knew she had social security at the 
time she married l\Ir. Christens('n, and she knew that 
when she married him she was going to lose it. I know 
l\frs. Flewelling is too smart to not know that." (Record 
No. 21, p. 12). 
The Affidavit of Prejudice, which was subsequently 
filed, indicates that the Court was prejudiced because 
he was personally acquainted with the plaintiff and had 
knowledge of her business transactions and past personal 
life. No contention \\·as made as to how said knowledge 
would prejudice the plaintiff or the defendant. Obviously, 
the Court had been acquainted with the plaintiff, which 
the plaintiff had to have known and had known from the 
time the case was filed until after it \ms tried. Not--
withstanding that, no Affidavit or Motion of Prejudice 
was filed until after the trial. 
The part of Rule 63 that is applicable to this is a:> 
follows: 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule G3 (b) "Dis-
qualification. '\VlwneV<'l' a party to any action 
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01· prn(·c·eding or hi:,; attorney shall make and file 
an affidavit that tlH~ .Judge before whom such 
action or i1roceeding is to be tried or heard has 
a bias o.r prejudice, either against such partv or 
his attorney or in favor of any opposite party to 
the suit, such judge shall proceed to further there-
in, except to call in another judge to hear and 
determine the matter. 
The meaning of this paragraph is clear, unequivocal 
and in no· way ambiguous. The pertinent part of the 
paragraph is "to be tried or heard." This clearly implies 
future proceedings. Anderson L Anderson, 13 Utah 236; 
3G8 P2d 264, is a case where a Petition was brought by 
the divorced husband for an Order to Show Cause why 
the award of custody to the divorced wife should not 
be vacated and why support money should not be termin-
ated. Prior to the time of taking evidence on said petition 
the defendant filed an Affidvait of Bias and Prejudice 
against the Court who was to sit, and did sit, on the 
case. Prior to taking the evidence the trial Court denied 
removal of the cause to another Judge. 
The Supreme Court held that was in error. 
However, the plaintiff cites no case wherein after 
a proceedings has started and evidence has been taken 
that the rule applies. The reason for this is obvious. 
Any competent trial lawyer would proceed to trial armed 
with an Affidavit of Prejudice and at any time during 
the proceedings, if he felt the Court was leaning toward 
the other side or he did not like the rulings of the Court 
on tlw admission of evidence he could immediately file 
tlw Affidavit of Prejudice, terminate the proceedings and 
start all over with another Judge. 
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This could continue ad infinitum until plaintiff's 
counsel felt that he was obtaining rulings favorable for 
his clinent, assuming that of course opposing counsel 
at that time did not file a similar Affidavit of Prejudice 
on behalf of his client. If plaintiff's position is to be 
sustained, then obviously no trial would proceed without 
the filing of an Affidavit of Prejudice and litigation 
would continue interminably. 
The clear intent of the rule, as it explicitly provides, 
is to afford either part~- an opportunity to disqualify a 
judge at any time prior to the taking of evidence. It 
does not purport and cannot be so interpreted to purport 
permission for either party to interrupt and terminate 
a trial that has been presented or partially presented 
theretofore by the mere filing of an Affidavit of Bias 
and Prejudice. 
It is submitted that the trial court had no alterna-
tive but to rule that the filing of the Affidavit of Bias 
and Prejudice was in fact untimely and to deny the same. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO FOL-
LOW THE ALLEGED STIPULATION OF PARTIES, 
(a) Because the same waived alimony. 
(b) Because plaintiff did not challenge the Stipu-
lation. 
( c) Because defendant did not claim that the same 
was obtained uy fraud, duress or misrepre-
sentation. 
(a) Because the same waived alinwny, 
(b) Because plaintiff di.d nut challenge the Stipu-
lation 
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'l'lw two points set forth above will be considered 
jointly by the ddendant. 
'11 lw defendant did in fact upon the day o.f execution 
of the eomplaint PXPcute a stipulation. At the same time 
hA executed an Entry of Appearance reserving unto him-
sr·lf 20 days to contest the matter. He subsequently did 
r·ontest all of the application of the plaintiff in hi::;: 
Answer and additionally executed his Counterclaim 
against the plaintiff asking that a divorce be granted 
unto himself. At the time of trial the defendant con-
t'eded that prior to the time he had employed counsel 
and prior to the time he decided what he was going 
to do he had executed the stipulation. (Record 21, pp. 2, 3) 
'l'he only real issue at the time of trial was the question 
of the property. (Record 21 pp. 2, 3) The plaintiff 
was well aware of the situation but argued that having 
executed the stipulation without benefit of counsel he 
has no· right at any time to contest this matter. The 
difficulty with this position is that it is contrary to 
law. The rule is well stated in 27B Corpus Juris Sec-
ondum, page 409." 
"Property settlement agreements are binding 
when approved by the court and embodied or 
merged in the decree entered by the court in a 
divorce proceeding unless it appears that the de-
cree was ]Jrocured through fraud." 
Further, at Page 411: 
"it has heen asserted generally that property 
settlement agreements must be approved hy the 
Court and embodied in the Decree in order to give 
them validity and efficacy, that it is the court's 
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decree which gives :mch settlement it::; validity." 
" '* "" * While it i::; true that hushand and wife 
cannot lawfully enter into an agreement for di-
vorce, yet it is well settled that the amount of 
alimony which the husband is to pay to the wife, 
the terms of the payment and the length of time 
during which such payment is to continue, may 
be all arranged between them by consent, subje;l 
to the ratification of the court.' " (Emphasis suv-
plied.) 
In the same case, North v. North the court held 
that it was the duty of the court to examine the 
agreement and further held that it was the duty 
of the court to approve the agreement if it found 
the contract was free from fraud, collusion, or 
compulsion and was fair to the wife. Thus we 
find that the mere entering into the contract 
between the parties and the filing of the contract 
in the cause do not make it a part of the judgment 
o.f the court until the court examines the entire 
contract and ratifies or approves it, either by a 
minute on the trial docket of the Judge or by 
making some other appropriate order or direc· 
tion. In addition to what has been said in the 
North case about the need for approval or ratifi-
cation of the agreement, we have a pro,vision in 
the "Stipulation" in the instant case that specific-
ally calls for approval by the trial court. 
Therefore, from what has been pointed out 
regarding the need for approval of the "Stipu-
lation" by the trial court, the only question before 
this court is whether there is sufficient evidence 
of judicial action by the trial court in connection 
with the hearing of plaintiff's petition for divorce 
in May, 1948 showing that the Court approved 
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all of tlw terms of the "Stipulation.'' 
A similar conelusion waH stated in the Virginia case 
lli9gi11s v. McFarland, 86 S.K 2d lGS; 196 Ya. 889, 
A decree for alimony is not founded on contract, 
but on the natural and legal duty of the husband 
to support the wife. No agreement of the parties 
has any effect on the decree awarding alimony 
unless it is ratified and made effective by judicial 
sanction. Capell v. Capell, 164 Va. 45, 178 S.E. 
894; Branch v. Branch, 144 Va. 244, 132 S.E. 303; 
Henebry v. Henebry, supra. Judgments and de-
crees are contracts of the highest order and espe-
cially is this so when entered by consent of the 
parties. Roberts' Arunr. v. Cocke, etc. 28 Grat. 
207, 69 Ya. 207; Hounshell v. Hounshell, 116 Va. 
675, 82 S.E. 689. 
St>e also, Arizona, Wright 1:. Stidman, 390 P2d 107; 
Georgia, Kaiser vs. Kaiser, H± S.E. 2d 397; Wisconsin, 
Bergevin v. Bergevin, 170 N.W. 820; California, Anthony 
v. Anthonu, 211 P2d 331. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has not specifically 
ruled on this question, however, it would appear that 
there can be no doubt that it would follow this rule. 
The very cases cited by the plaintiff as authority for 
its position clearly state that a trial court is not bound 
by any stipulation. That such stipulation, while not to 
be considered lightly, is advisory only and that the 
Court, in the exercise of its sole discretion, may adopt 
or reject a stipulation. Thus in Madsen v. J.lfodsen, 276 
P.2d 917; 2 Utah 2d ±23, the Court had before it an 
appeal by a wife where the trial court had not abided by 
the proposed stipulation. 'l'he Supreme Court, in affirm-
ing the trial court, stated: 
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ln so assuming tihe erred, tiince tltl' trial comt 
in divo.rce matters, where the state is an inter~ 
ested party, nc'e>d not ahick, necessarily, with the 
terms of the litigants' stipulations, although such 
stipulations should be respected and great weight 
given thereto. Plaintiff's only complaint in thi~ 
respect, would hl•, not that the~ c·ourt was dutv 
bound and erroneously refused to carry out th~ 
terms agreed upon, but that it abused its discre-
tion by entering an inequitable decn~e, a matter 
we must determine on review. Unless there is a 
clear abuse of discretion, we cannot disturb the 
trial court on such matters. 
This is precisely contrary to the statement of the plain-
tiff that the comi has not ruled upon the power of the 
Court to alter a stipulation unless it be shown that there 
be fraud, duress, or misrepresenation. An examination 
of Madsen v. Madsen dot>s not indicate any place that 
these allegations were present in the case or that an 
issue was framed thereon. 
Similarly, Mathie v. Mathie, 363 P.2d 779; 12 Utah 2d 
116, was a case where the wife appealed from a Decree 
of Divorce insofar as it disclosed the property. The 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court with some mod-
ifications that it deemed necessary for the purpose of 
clarification, saying, in part: 
It is apparent that the trial court, ht>ing convinced 
that the parties had come to a necessary parting 
of the ways, and that grounds for divoree \Vere 
established, proceeded to consider the various 
factors proper to take into. account and in the 
li ()'ht thereof made such adjustment of their prop-
e;ty rights as he thought would provide the best 
foundation for each to liw separately. Having 
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dorn• so, it is our duty to give deference to his 
a~lvantaged position and prerogatives, and not to 
disturb the decree unless it is sh0\n1 clearly and 
1wrsuasively to be so unfair and inequitable as 
to manifest an abuse of the wide discretion re-
posed in the trial court in such matters. 
'11he parties canno,t by contract completely defeat 
the authority expressly conferred upon the Court 
by our statute, Sec. 30-3-5, U.C.A. 1953, in cases 
o.f divorce to "make such orders in relation to 
* '' * property * * * as may be equitable." Under 
it there can be no doubt of the court's prerogative 
to make \Yhatever disposition of the property, 
including the rights in such a contract, as it deems 
fair, equitable and necessary for the protection 
and welfare of the parties. There is no basis for 
C'oncluding that the decree entered in the instant 
case is so manifestly inequitable or unjust that 
we should upset it. 
'l'he l\fathiti case was a case identical to the case 
at Bar to the extent that in the Mathie case no alimony 
or support was asked or awarded. This is precisely the 
same factor that plaintiff relies on to take it out of 
the decisions of Utah. The very cases cited by plaintiff 
are actually authority for the proposition that the fact 
that a stipulation does not contain provisions for alimony 
or snpport money are not binding upon the Court in the 
ahsenee of fraud, undue influence or misrepresentation. 
Again the court in the Mathie case does not cite the 
prnbk•m of fraud, undue influence or misrepresentation, 
nor did it find it necessary to find these elements before 
n <·mut could deviate from the terms of the stipulation. 
'I'lw n·maining cases cited by the plaintiff, to-wit: CaUi-
ster 1-. Callister, 261 P.2d 944; Barraclough v. Barra-
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clough, 11 P.2d 792 - 100 U. 196; Hall v. Hall, 177 P.2d 
731 - 111 U. 263; and Jones v. Jones, 139 P.2d 222 -
104 U. 275, do not support plaintiff's position. Hall v. 
Hall was a case invo·lving contempt proceedings. While 
it discussed the power of the Court to adopt or reject 
a stipulation, an examination of the facts indicate that 
the evidence discloses that he had been out of work, 
remarried, had attempted to borrow money from the 
bank to keep the payments current and that he had 
done all he could do and had done all that his wife had 
requested him to do. The Court found that the adjudica-
tion of contempt was not well founded. The other three 
cases, Jones 1-'. Jones, Barraclough v. Barraclough, and 
Callister v. Callister were concerned with the power of 
the Court to modify a decree of divorce where such 
decree either incorporated therein or approved a stipula-
tion theretofore entered. In each of these cases the 
Court recognizes the authority inherent in the trial court 
to subsequently modify a decree, notwithstanding the 
fact that it was entered into with the accordance of 
stipulation by the parties. 
Thus in Barracloiigh v. Barraclough, 11 P.2d 792, 
100 U. 196, the Court stated: 
Therefore, the trial court erred in determining 
that the agreement here constituted a "complete 
and final settlement of all alimony between the 
parties, and that such settlement has become a 
final judgment as to alimony * * * insofar as 
a petition to modify is concerned.'' In a divorce 
action the trial court should make such provision 
for alimony as the present circumstances of the 
parties \Varrant, and any stipulation of the partie:s 
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in n•speet thereto serves only as a recommenda-
tion to the court. If the court adopts the sng-
µ;(•sti(m of the parties it does not thereby lose 
the right to make such modification or dhange 
tlwn~after as nmy be requested by either party 
lrnsed on some change in circumstances warrant-
ing such modification. And where an appeal is 
taken from the judgment of the trial court in such 
case we will review the record to determine 
whether or not the applicant is entitled to the 
relief sought in the petition to modify the alimo.ny 
decree. Hampton v. Hampton, 86 Utah 570, 47 
P.2d 419; Openshaw v. Openshaw, 80 Utah 9, 12 
P.2d 364. 
In Jones v. Junes, 139 P. 2d 222, 104 U. 27G, the Court 
cited the Barraclough case with approval. 
In CaUister v. Callister 261 P.2d 944, the Court 
stated: 
... an agreement or stipulation between parties 
to a divorce suit as to alimony or payments for 
suppo·rt of children is not binding upon the court 
in entering a divorce decree, but serves only as 
a reconm1endation, and if the court adopts the 
suggestion of the parties it does not thereby lose 
the right to make such modification or change 
thereafter as may be requested by either party, 
based upon change of circumstances warranting 
such modification. Jones v. Jones, 104 Utah 275, 
129 P.2d 222; Barraclough v. Barraclough, 100 
Utah 19G, 111 P.2d 792. 
Jn said decision the Court disenssed the decisions that 
hold that a Court has no power after judgment to modify 
a d<>crt'P, based n1ion an agreed property settlement, and 
JH'kl: 
But insofar as the decision might be considered 
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authority for th(~ doctrine that the court ha:::; no 
jurisdiction to modify an award of alimony in 
a case where tl1ere ha:::; been a property :settlement, 
we are not inclined to follow it. 
It is obvious tlwreforP that rule in Utah requires (1) 
an agrel'd stipulation by tlw parties, and ( 2) that even 
though an agreed stipulation i:::; submitted by the parties 
to the Court that it is advi.sory only and that the trial 
court need not adopt tht• :same, and that this power 
to deviate includes the power to modify the :::;arne, 
whether the same incoq)orate:::; the stipulation or not. 
In this case the defendant eleetPd to contest the pro-
visions of the stipulation. He further elected to dispute 
her right to any property acquired by the defendant prior 
to the nwrriage. Further, the trial court found that it 
would be unequitable and unjust to award her substan-
tially all of the property owned by the defendant after 
only one year of ma1 riage. Even so the court did in 
fact award her approximately one-third of the assets 
that he had prior to entering into the marital agreement. 
This i:::; in accord ·with the rule that has long been recog-
nized in Utah on an award of one-third of the husband's 
property to the ·wife. Griffin v. Griffin, 18 Utah 98, 55 
PS-!; Porter v. Porter, 109 Utah 444, 16G P.2d 51G; 
Bullen v. B11llcn, 71 Uah 63, 262 P. 292. 
The decision of the trial court was entirely within 
the scope of cases previously approved by the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah. The plaintiff does not 
contend that then' ·was an abuse of discretion per se. 
She merdy says that the amount of money allocatPd 1rns 
insufficient and that the court did not cooperate and 
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;l1J1i~;(•<l it;-; dis<·rdion h~- following the rnle:s sd down hy 
tit<• t-ltate of (!tali. 
l'·) /:1 <tlfs(' lie did llOf doim !hut !he 8tip1tlatio11 
/( u.; nl1i<:;,;erl /;y Fnmd, Duress, or Misrcpre-
s1· 11 tut /011 . 
. \s l1a~ lwrdofon· lw<:•11 set•n the trial courts in Utah 
<1o lwv<' th<• right to disregard a stipulation and in fact 
liaw tlH: power to modify a Decree which adopted or 
<l] 1proved the same. The only cases tliat the Court cites 
arl' hrn California decisions, Ale:rander v. Alexander, 
l~J9 P.2d 3-tS, and Hallmccl! L Hallowell, 179 P.2d 22. 
Both of these cas< ~; are Cali l'urnia decision::;. '11hey hold 
that a Court <:annot modify v. decree o.f divorce wherein 
tht• 1kcreP adopts a stipulation voluntarily entered by the 
parti(•s as has been previously seen. The Utah Court 
ha~; considered this precise argument in Barraclough r. 
Burraclou.!Jh and chose specifically not to adopt the same. 
EvPn this rule is not as rigid as counsel would have 
tlw Court believe. Thus in Morgan v. Ill organ, 234 P.2d 
782, tlw Court had before it the problem of one party 
<1t:•manding that the prior property settlement be en-
fo1e<•d upon their spouse ·who claimed that the agreement 
had been in fact cancelled and terminated. The trial 
<'onrt agr<'<>d with the latter contention and upon appeal 
:oo d!d the Court of appeals say: 
\Vhether, in such a case, the agre<:.•ment does or 
does not continue in force, depends upon the 
mutual intentio.ns and understanding of the par-
tiPs. It is to be detennined by the court as a 
qne::;tion or fact, and upon indirect evidence in 
tlw 2 l):oeneL' of di rec·t eviclene<'. As said in Estate 
of Boeson, :201 Cal. 3G, 42, 255 P. SOO, 802: ''Prop 
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erty settlements entered into by the spousPs, it i:.: 
true, should be set aside in cases where the act8, 
conduct and relations of the parti<>s tliereaftl•r an· 
of such a character as to justify the conclusion 
that they intended and agreed orally to abrngatt: 
the same (citing cases)." It has fn•quently bt'en 
held, at least as to executory pl'Ovisions of a 
property settlement agreement, that cancellation 
will be inf erred and former rights will he rc·-
stored by reconciliation and resumption of mar-
ital relation. Mundt v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins_ 
Co., 35 Cal, App. 2d JlG, 95 P.2d 966; Wells v. 
Stout, 9 Cal. 479; Sargent v. Sargent, 106 Cal. 
5+1, 39 P. 931; Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Ind. Ace 
Comm., Gl Cal. App. 2d. 275, 142 P.2d 754; Gregg 
v. Manufacturers Bldg. Corp., 134 Cal. App. 147, 
25 P.2d 1014. See also, 30 C.J. 1065, 106G, 4~ 
C.J.S., Husband and ·wife, 601; Nelson on Di-
vorce, Y ol. 1, p, 495, sec. 13.14. 
Each case is to be decided on its own facts 
It is unnecessary to distinguish the cases relied 
upon by appellant which had only that the evi 
dence was sufficient to support findings contrary 
to the claim that the several property settlement 
agreements were abrogated by subsequent oral 
agreements. 
The gist of this argument by the plaintiff is that she now 
requests the Supreme Court to set forth and adopt the 
California minority view, which it has heretofore rejec-
ted. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRE-
TION. 
The plaintiff states that as a rule of law the Supreme 
Court has a right to modify under proper circumstance~ 
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thP <kcision of a trial court in a divorce action, and that 
;is a conSl'(lllf'm·c the Supreme Court should in this case 
modify th<' trial Court's decision. 11he plaintiff does not 
~ay wh~· it should be modified, how and in what manner 
1lw Court abused its discretion, how and why the decision 
(;L th<' trial court is inequitable other than the fact that 
she does not like the decision. 
As the records previously set out indicate the parties 
had been married approximately one year; that at the 
time of th0i r marriage the plaintiff had properties of a 
value of $68,500.00, hau a home with a rental apartment 
therein. That the defendant, a man of 68 years of age, 
unemployed with a $200.00 a month pension, a $5,000.00 
savings account and an unimproved piece of ground 
from which he receives the sum of $100.00 per year. All 
of thP property had been acquired by both the plaintiff 
and the defendant prior to the time of their marriage. 
The Court awarded plaintiff $1500.00 of the $5,000.00 
savings acquired by the defendant. 
The plaintiff dot's not say how or in what manner 
this is unjust or inequitable, and cites no authority that 
it is. Counsel's only argument is that defendant should 
he bound by a repudiated stipulation and that the court, 
contrary to law, should also be bound by such repudiated 
stipulation and as a consequence the trial court so clearly 
abus0d its discretion that it committed error. No author-
ities were cited in support of this other than the re-
pudiatt•d California decisions. It is submitted on the 
fads and on the law that no abuse of the law was in fact 
rnnd<' and tlwre is no rPason for this court not to affirm 
HtP trial court's findings. 
17 
POINT IV 
REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO ACCEPT THE 
PLAINTIFF'S PROFFERS OF PROOF. 
Refusal of the Court to admit the proffered evidence 
is again without foundation in fact and in law. The plain-
tiff was afforded an opportunity to present evidence as 
to her need, value of her property, as well as the value 
of the property of the defendant; she made no effort 
to do so. Instead she chose to ignore her relative wealth 
and the relative poverty of the defendant and complained 
of her lost Social Security benefits. Having waived the 
right to introduce actuarial evidence when it should have 
been presented, she chose to attempt to expand the order 
of the trial court for her own purposes. Now, having 
failed to avail herself of even that extension complains 
because it was not extended further. Having waived 
her opportunities she now complains that the trial court 
erred because it did not grant further opportunities. 
It is respectfully suggested that no authorities have 
been submitted, because none existed, which support this 
view that prejudicial error was committed. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the appeal of the 
plaintiff should be dismissed and that the defendant 
should be awarded his costs herein. 
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